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Abstract
In the paper we consider the controlled continuous-time Markov chain de-
scribing the interacting particles system with the finite number of types. The
system is controlled by two players with the opposite purposes. The limit-
ing game as the number of particles tends to infinity is a zero-sum differential
game. Krasovskii–Subbotin extremal shift provides the optimal strategy in
the limiting game. The main result of the paper is the near optimality of the
Krasovskii–Subbotin extremal shift rule for the original Markov game.
Keywords: continuous time Markov games, differential games, extremal shift
rule, control with guide strategies.
1 Introduction
The paper is devoted to the construction of near optimal strategies for zero-sum
two players continuous-time Markov game based on deterministic game. The term
‘Markov game’ is used for a Markov chain with the Kolmogorov matrix depending
on controls of players. These games are also called continuous-time stochastic games.
First continuous-time Markov games were studied by Zachrisson [1]. The information
of recent progress in the theory of continuous-time Markov games can be found in
[2], [3] and references therein.
We consider the case when the continuous-time Markov chain describes the inter-
acting particle system. The interacting particle system converges to the deterministic
system as the number of particles tends to infinity [4], [5] (see also [6], [7]). The value
function of the controlled Markov chain converges to the value function of the limit-
ing control system [4] (see also corresponding result for discrete-time systems in [8]).
This result is extended to the case of zero-sum games as well as to the case of nonzero-
sum games [4]. If the nonanticipative strategy is optimal for differential game then
it is near optimal for the Markov game [4]. However the nonanticipative strategies
require the knowledge of the control of the second player. Often this information is
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inaccessible and the player has only the information about current position. In this
case one can use feedback strategies or control with guide strategies.
Control with guide strategies were proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin to con-
struct the solution of deterministic differential game under informational distur-
bances [9]. Note that the feedback strategies do not provide the stable solution
of the differential game. If the player uses control with guide strategy, then the con-
trol is formed stepwise, and the player has a model of the system and she uses this
model to choose an appropriate control using extremal shift rule. The value function
is achieved in the limit when the time between control corrections tends to zero. In
the original work by Krasovskii and Subbotin the motion of the model is governed
by the system that is a copy of the original system and the motion of the original
system is close to the motion of the model. Therefore the model can be called guide.
Note that formally control with guide strategy is a strategy with memory. However,
it suffices to storage only finite number of vectors. Additionally, the player should
use computer to obtain the state of the guide at the time of control correction.
Control with guide strategies realizing the extremal shift were used for the differ-
ential games without Lipschitz continuity of the dynamics in [10] and for the games
governed by delay differential equations in [11], [12]. Krasovskii and Kotelnikova
proposed the stochastic control with guide strategies [13]–[15]. In that case the real
motion of the deterministic system is close to the auxiliary stochastic process gener-
ated by optimal control for the stochastic differential game. The Nash equilibrium
for two-player game in the class of control with guide strategies was constructed via
extremal shift in [16].
In this paper we let the player use the control with guide strategy realizing ex-
tremal shift rule in the Markov game. We assume that the motion of the guide is
given by the limiting deterministic differential game. We estimate the expectation of
the distance between the Markov chain and the motions of the model (guide). This
leads to the estimate between the outcome of the player in the Markov game and the
value function of the limiting differential game.
The paper is organized as follows. In preliminary Section 2 we describe the Markov
game describing the interacting particle system and the limiting deterministic differ-
ential game. In Section 3 we give the explicit definition of control with guide strategies
and formulate the main results. Section 4 is devoted to a property of transition prob-
abilities. In Section 5 we estimate the expectation of distance between the Markov
chain and the deterministic guide. Section 6 provides the proofs of the statements
formulated in Section 3.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the system of finite number particles. Each particle can be of
type i, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. The type of each particle is a random variable gov-
erned by a Markov chain. To specify this chain consider the Kolmogorov ma-
trix Q(t, x, u, v) = (Qij(t, x, u, v))
d
i,j=1. That means that the elements of matrix
Q(t, x, u, v) satisfy the following properties
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• Qij(t, x, u, v) ≥ 0 for i 6= j;
•
Qii(t, x, u, v) = −
∑
j 6=i
Qij(t, x, u, v). (1)
Here
t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Σd = {(x1, . . . , xn) : xi ≥ 0, x1 + . . .+ xn = 1}, u ∈ U, v ∈ V.
Suppose that U and V are compact sets. The variables u and v are controlled by the
first and the second players respectively. Below we assume that x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a
row-vector. Additionally we assume that
• Q is a continuous function of its variable;
• for any t, u and v the function x 7→ Q(t, x, u, v) is Lipschitz continuous;
• for any t ∈ [0, T ], ξ, x ∈ Rn the following equality holds true
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈ξ, xQ(t, x, u, v)〉 = max
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈ξ, xQ(t, x, u, v)〉 (2)
Condition (2) is an analog of well-known Isaacs condition.
For a fixed parameters x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , and v ∈ V the type of each particle is
determined by the Markov chain with the generator
(Q(t, x, u, v)f)i =
∑
j 6=i
Qij(t, x, u, v)(fj − fi), f = (f1, . . . , fd).
The another way to specify the Markov chain is the Kolmogorov forward equation
d
dt
P (s, t, x) = P (s, t, x)Q(t, x, u, v).
Here P (s, t, x) = (Pij(s, t, x))
d
ij=1 is the matrix of the transition probabilities.
Now we consider the controlled mean-field interacting particle system (see [4]).
Let ni be a number of particles of the type i. The vector N = (n1, . . . , nd) ∈ Zd+ is
the state of the system consisting of |N | = n1 + . . . + nd particles. For i 6= j and a
vector N = (n1, . . . , nd) denote by N
[ij] the vector obtained from N by removing one
particle of type i and adding one particle of type j i.e. we replace the i-th coordinate
with ni − 1 and the j-th coordinate with nj + 1. The mean-field interacting particle
system is a Markov chain with the generator
Lht [u, v]f(N) =
d∑
i,j=1
niQij(t, N/|N |, u(t), v(t))[f(N [ij])− f(N)].
The purpose of the first (respectively, second) player is to minimize (respectively,
maximize) the expectation of σ(N/|N |).
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Denote the inverse number of particles by h = 1/|N |. Normalizing the states of
the interacting particle system we get the generator (see [4])
Lht [u, v]f(N/|N |) =
d∑
i,j=1
1
h
ni
|N |Qij(t, N/|N |, u(t), v(t))
[
f
(
N [ij]
|N |
)
− f
(
N
|N |
)]
. (3)
Denote the vector N/|N | by x = (x1, . . . , xd). Thus, we have that
Lht [u, v]f(x) =
d∑
i,j=1
1
h
xiQij(t, x, u(t), v(t))[f(x− hei + hej)− f(x)].
Here ei is the i-th coordinate vector. The vector x belongs to the set
Σhd = {(x1, . . . , xd) : xi ∈ hZ, x1 + . . .+ xd = 1} ⊂ Σd.
Further, let Udet[s] (respectively, Vdet[s]) denote the set of deterministic controls
of the first (respectively, second) player on [s, T ], i.e.
Udet[s] = {u : [s, T ]→ U measurable}, Vdet[s] = {v : [s, T ]→ V measurable}.
Let (Ω,F , {Ft}, P ) be a filtered probability space. Extending the definition given
in [17, p. 135] to the stochastic game case, we say that the pair of stochastic processes
u and v on [s, T ] is an admissible pair of controls if
1. u(t) ∈ U , v(t) ∈ V ;
2. the processes u and v are progressive measurable;
3. for any y ∈ Σhd there exists an unique {Ft}t∈[s,T ]-adapted ca`dla`g stochastic
process Xh(t, s, y, u, v) taking values in Σhd , starting at y at time s and satisfying
the following condition
E
h
syf(X
h(t, s, y, u, v))− f(y) =
∫ t
s
E
h
syL
h
t [u(τ), v(τ)]f(X
h(τ, s, y, u, v))dτ. (4)
Here Ehsy denotes the conditional expectation of corresponding stochastic processes.
The purposes of the players can be reformulated in the following way. The first
(respectively, second) player wishes to minimize (respectively, maximize) the value
E
h
syσ(Xh(T, s, y, u, v)).
Let Uh[s] be a set of stochastic processes u taking values in U such that the pair
(u, v) is admissible for any v ∈ Vdet[s]. Analogously, let Vh[s] be a set of stochastic
processes v taking values in V such that the pair (u, v) is admissible for any u ∈ Udet[s].
Denote by P hsy(A) the conditional probability of the event A under condition that
the Markov chain corresponding to the parameter h starts at y at time s, i.e.
P hsy(A) = E
h
sy1A
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Further, let ph(s, y, t, z, u, v) denote the transition probability i.e.
ph(s, y, t, z, u, v) = P hsy(X
h(t, s, y, u, v) = z) = Ehsy1{z}(X
h(t, s, y, u, v)).
The substituting 1{z} for f in (3) and (4) gives that
ph(s, y, t, z, v) = ph(s, y, s, z, u, v)
+
1
h
∫ t
s
E
h
sy
d∑
i,j=1
Xh,i(τ, s, y, u, v)Qij(τ,Xh(τ, s, y, u, v), u(τ), v(τ))
· [1z(Xh(τ, s, y, u, v)− hei + hej)− 1z(Xh(τ, s, y, u, v))]dτ. (5)
Here Xh,i(τ, s, y, u, v) denotes the i-th component of Xh(τ, s, y, u, v).
Recall, see [4], that if h→ 0, then the generator Lht [u, v] converges to the generator
Λt[u, v]f(x) =
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(t, x, u(t), v(t))
[
∂f
∂xj
(x)− ∂f
∂xi
(x)
]
=
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(t, x, u(t), v(t))− xkQki(t, x, u(t), v(t))] ∂f
∂xk
(x).
For controls u ∈ Udet[s] and v ∈ Vdet[s] the deterministic evolution generated by the
Λt[u(t), v(t)] is described by the equation
d
dt
ft(x) =
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(t, x, u(t), v(t))− xkQki(t, x, u(t), v(t))] ∂ft
∂xk
(x),
fs(x) = f(x). (6)
Here the function ft(y) is equal to f(x(t)) when x(s) = y. The characteristics of (6)
solve the ODEs
d
dt
xk(t) =
∑
i 6=k
[xi(t)Qik(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))− xk(t)Qki(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))]
=
d∑
i=1
xi(t)Qik(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)).
One can rewrite this equation in the vector form
d
dt
x(t) = x(t)Q(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ U, v(t) ∈ V. (7)
For given u ∈ Udet[s], v ∈ Vdet[s] denote the solution of initial value problem for (7)
and condition x(s) = y by x(·, s, y, u, v). Consider the deterministic zero-sum game
with the dynamics given by (7) and terminal payoff equal to σ(x(T, s, y, u, v)). This
game has a value that is a continuous function of the position. Denote it by Val(s, y).
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Recall (see [18]) that the function Val(s, y) is a minimax (viscosity) solution of the
Hamilton–Jacobi PDE
∂W
∂t
+H(t, x,∇W ) = 0, W (T, x) = σ(x). (8)
Here the Hamiltonian H is defined by the rule
H(t, x, ξ) = min
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈ξ, xQ(t, x, u, v)〉.
3 Control with guide strategies
In this section we introduce the control with guide strategies for the Markov game.
It is assumed that the control is formed stepwise and the player has an information
about the current state of the system i.e. the vector x is known. Additionally,
we assume that the player can evaluate the expected state and the player’s control
depends on current state of the system and on the evaluated state. This evaluation
is called guide. At each time of control correction the player computes the value of
the guide and the control that is used up to the next time of control correction.
Formally (see [19]), control with guide strategy of player 1 is a triple u =
(u(t, x, w), ψ1(t+, t, x, w), χ1(s, y)). Here the function u(t, x, w) is equal to the control
implemented after time t if at time t the state of the system is x and the state of the
guide is w. The function ψ1(t+, t, x, w) determines the state of the guide at time t+
under the condition that at time t the state of the system is x and the state of the
guide is w. The function χ1 initializes the guide i.e. χ1(s, y) is the state of the guide
in the initial position (s, y).
We use the control with guide strategies for Markov game with the generator
Lht . Here we assume that h > 0 is fixed. Let (s, y) be an initial position, s ∈ [0, T ]
y ∈ Σhd . Assume that player 1 chooses the control with guide strategy u and the
partition ∆ = {tk}mk=0 of the time interval [s, T ]; whereas player 2 chooses the control
v ∈ Vh[s]. This control can be also formed stepwise using some second player’s control
with guide strategy.
We say that the stochastic process X h1 [·, s, y, u,∆, v] is generated by strategy u,
partition ∆ and the second player’s control v if for t ∈ [tk, tk+1) X h1 [t, s, y, u,∆, v] =
Xh(t, tk, xk, uk, v), where
• x0 = y, w0 = χ1(t0, x0), u0 = u(t0, x0, w0);
• for k = 1, r xk = Xh(tk, tk−1, xk−1, uk−1, v), wk = ψ1(tk, tk−1, xk−1, wk−1), uk =
u(tk, xk, wk).
Note that even though the state of the guide wk is determined by the deterministic
function it depends on the random variable xk−1. Thus, wk is a random variable.
Below we define the first player’s control with guide strategy that realizes the
extremal shift rule (see [9]). Let ϕ be a supersolution of equation (8). That means
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(see [18]) that for any (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]×Σd, t+ > t∗ and v∗ ∈ V there exists a solution
ζ1(·, t+, t∗, x∗, v∗) of differential inclusion
ζ˙1(t) ∈ co{ζ1(t)Q(t, ζ1(t), u, v∗) : u ∈ U}
satisfying conditions ζ1(t∗, t+, t∗, x∗, v∗) = x∗ and ϕ(t+, ζ1(t+, t+, t∗, x∗, v∗)) ≤
ϕ(t∗, x∗).
Define the control with guide strategy uˆ = (uˆ, ψˆ1, χˆ1) by the following rules. If
t∗, t+ ∈ [0, T ], t+ > t∗, x∗, w∗ ∈ Σd, then choose u∗, v∗ by the rules
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v)〉 = max
v∈V
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)〉, (9)
max
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v)〉 = min
u∈U
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v∗)〉. (10)
Put
(u1) uˆ(t∗, x∗, w∗) = u∗,
(u2) ψˆ1(t+, t∗, x∗, w∗) = ζ1(t+, t+, t∗, w∗, v∗),
(u3) χˆ1(s, y) = y.
Note that if the first player uses the strategy uˆ in the differential game with the
dynamics given by (7) then she guarantees the limit outcome not greater then ϕ
(see [9], [18]). If additionally ϕ = Val, then the strategy uˆ is optimal in the deter-
ministic game.
The main result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1. Assume that σ is Lipschitz continuous with a constant R, and the
function ϕ is a supersolution of (8). If the first player uses the control with guide
strategy uˆ determined by (u1)–(u3) for the function ϕ then
(i)
lim
δ↓0
sup{Ehsy(σ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])) : d(∆) ≤ δ, v ∈ Vh[s]}
≤ ϕ(s, y) +R
√
Dh.
(ii)
lim
δ↓0
sup
{
P hsy
(
σ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) ≥ ϕ(s, y) +R 3
√
Dh
)
:
d(∆) ≤ δ, v ∈ Vh[s]
}
≤ 3
√
Dh.
Here D is a constant not dependent on ϕ and σ.
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The theorem is proved in Section 6.
Now let us consider the case when the second player uses control with guide
strategies. The control with guide strategy of the second player is a triple v =
(v(t, x, w), ψ2(t+, t, x, w), χ2(s, y)). Here w denotes the state of the second player’s
guide. The control in this case is formed also stepwise. If (s, y) is an initial position,
∆ is a partition of time interval [s, T ] and u ∈ Uh[s] is a control of player 1 then
denote by X h2 [·, s, y, v,∆, u] the corresponding stochastic process.
Let ω be a subsolution of equation (8). That means (see [18]) that for any (t∗, x∗) ∈
[0, T ]×Σd, t+ > t∗ and u∗ there exists a trajectory ζ2(·, t+, t∗, x∗, u∗) of the differential
inclusion
ζ˙2(t) ∈ co{ζ2(t)Q(t, ζ2(t), u∗, v) : v ∈ V }
satisfying conditions ζ2(t∗, t+, t∗, x∗, u
∗) = x∗ and ω(t+, ζ2(t+, t+, t∗, x∗, u
∗)) ≥
ω(t∗, x∗).
Define the strategy vˆ by the following rule. If (t∗, x∗) is a position, t+ > t∗ and
w∗ ∈ Σd is a state of the guide then choose v∗ and u∗ by the rules
min
v∈V
max
u∈U
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v)〉 = max
u∈U
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v∗)〉,
max
u∈U
min
v∈V
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v)〉 = min
v∈V
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)〉.
Put
(v1) v(t∗, x∗, w∗) = v
∗,
(v2) ψ2(t+, t∗, x∗, w∗) = ζ2(t+, t+, t∗, x∗, u
∗)
(v3) χ2(s, y) = y.
Corollary 1. If the second player uses the control with guide strategy vˆ determined
by (v1)–(v3) for the function ω that is a subsolution of (8), then
(i)
lim
δ↓0
inf{Ehsy(σ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])) : d(∆) ≤ δ, u ∈ Uh[s]}
≥ ω(s, y)−R
√
Dh.
(ii)
lim
δ↓0
sup
{
P hsy
(
σ(X h2 [T, s, y, vˆ,∆, u]) ≤ ω(s, y)− R 3
√
Dh
)
:
d(∆) ≤ δ, u ∈ Uh[s]
}
≤ 3
√
Dh.
The corollary is also proved in Section 6.
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4 Properties of transition probabilities
Now we prove the following.
Lemma 1. There exists a function αh(δ) such that αh(δ)→ 0 as δ → 0 and for any
t∗, t+ ∈ [0, T ], ξ, η ∈ Σd, ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd), u¯ ∈ U , v¯ ∈ Vh[t∗]
1. if η = ξ, then
ph(t∗, ξ, t+, η, u¯, v¯)
≤ 1 + 1
h
d∑
k=1
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
ξkQkk(t∗, ξ, u¯, v)ντ (dv)dτ + α
h(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗);
2. if η = ξ − hei + hej, then
ph(t∗, ξ, t+, η, u, v) ≤ 1
h
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
ξiQij(t∗, ξ, u¯, v)ντ(dv)dτ +α
h(t+− t∗) · (t+− t∗);
3. if η 6= ξ and η 6= ξ − hei + hej, then
ph(t∗, ξ, t+, η, u, v) ≤ αh(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗);
Here ντ is a measure on V depending on t∗, t+, ξ, η, u¯ and v¯.
Proof. First denote
K = sup{|Qij(t, x, u, v)| : i, j = 1, d, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Σd, u ∈ U, v ∈ Q}. (11)
Note that for any x ∈ Σd, t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U , v ∈ V the following estimates hold true
‖x‖ ≤
√
d,
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
xiQij(t, x, u, v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K, ‖xQ(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ K√d. (12)
Further, let γ(δ) be a common modulus of continuity with respect to t of the functions
Qij i.e. for all i, j, t
′, t′′ ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Σd, u ∈ U , v ∈ Q
|Qij(t′, x, u, v)−Qij(t′′, x, u, v)| ≤ γ(t′′ − t′) (13)
and γ(δ)→ 0 as δ → 0. From (5) and (12) we obtain that
ph(t∗, ξ, t, η, u, v) ≤ ph(t∗, ξ, t∗, η, u, v) + 2Kd
h
(t− t∗). (14)
Further, for a given control v¯ ∈ Vh[t∗] let Eht∗ξ;τx denote the expectation under
conditions Xh(t∗, t∗, ξ, u¯, v¯) = ξ, and X
h(τ, t∗, ξ, u¯, v¯) = x.
We have that
E
h
t∗ξf =
∑
x∈Σh
d
E
h
t∗ξ;τxf · ph(t∗, ξ, τ, x, u¯, v¯).
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From this and (5) we get
ph(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯) = p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯)
+
1
h
∫ t
t∗
∑
x∈Σh
d
E
h
t∗ξ;τx
d∑
i,j=1
xiQi,j(τ, x, u¯, v¯(τ))[1η(x− hei + hej)− 1η(x)]
·p(t∗, ξ, τ, x, u¯, v¯)dτ ≤ p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯)
+
1
h
∫ t
t∗
∑
x∈Σh
d
E
h
t∗ξ;τx
d∑
i,j=1
xiQi,j(τ, x, u¯, v¯(τ))[1η(x− hei + hej)− 1η(x)]
·p(t∗, ξ, t∗, x, u¯, v¯)dτ + 2K
2d2
h
(t− t∗)2.
We have that p(t∗, ξ, t∗, x, u¯, v¯) = 1 for x = ξ and p(t∗, ξ, t∗, x, u¯, v¯) = 0 for x 6= ξ.
Thus,
ph(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯) ≤ p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯)
+
1
h
∫ t
t∗
E
h
t∗ξ;τξ
d∑
i,j=1
ξiQi,j(τ, ξ, u¯, v¯(τ))[1η(ξ − hei + hej)− 1η(ξ)] + 2K
2d2
h
(t− t∗)2
≤ p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯,v¯)
+
1
h
∫ t
t∗
E
h
t∗ξ;τξ
d∑
i,j=1
ξiQi,j(t∗, ξ, u¯, v¯(τ))[1η(ξ − hei + hej)− 1η(ξ)]dτ
+
2K2d2
h
(t− t∗)2 + 2d
h
γ(t− t∗) · (t− t∗).
There exists a measure ντ on V such that
Et∗ξ;τξQij(t∗, ξ, u¯, v¯(τ)) =
∫
V
Qij(t∗, ξ, u¯, v)ντ(dv).
Consequently,
ph(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯) ≤ p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯)
+
1
h
∫ t
t∗
∫
V
d∑
i,j=1
ξiQi,j(t∗, ξ, u¯, v)[1η(ξ − hei + hej)− 1η(ξ)]ντ (dv)dτ
+ α(t− t∗) · (t− t∗). (15)
Here we denote
α(δ) =
2K2d2
h
(δ)2 +
2d
h
γ(δ).
From (15) the second and third statements of the Lemma follows. To derive the first
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statement use the property of Kolmogorov matrixes (1). We have that
ph(t∗, ξ, t, ξ, u¯, v¯) ≤ p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯)
− 1
h
∫ t
t∗
∫
V
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
ξiQi,j(t∗, ξ, u¯, v)ντ (dv)dτ + α(t− t∗) · (t− t∗)
= p(t∗, ξ, t, η, u¯, v¯) +
1
h
∫ t
t∗
∫
V
d∑
i=1
ξiQi,i(t∗, ξ, u¯, v)ντ (dv)dτ + α(t− t∗) · (t− t∗).
5 Key estimate
This section provides the estimate of the distance between the controlled Markov
chain and the guide. This estimate is an analog of [9, Lemma 2.3.1].
Lemma 2. There exist constants β, C > 0, and a function κh(δ) such that κh(δ)→ 0
as δ → 0 and the following property holds true.
If
1. (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Σhd, w∗ ∈ Σd, t+ > t∗,
2. the controls u∗ v∗ are chosen by rules (9) and (10) respectively,
3. w+ = ζ1(t+, t+, t∗, w∗, v∗),
then for any v ∈ Vh[t∗]
E
h
t∗x∗(‖X (t+, t∗, x∗, u∗, v)− w+‖2)
≤ (1 + β(t+ − t∗))‖x∗ − w∗‖+ Ch(t+ − t∗) + κh(t+ − t∗) · (t− t∗).
Proof. Denote the i-th component of vector x∗ by x∗i.
We have that
E
h
t∗x∗(‖X (t+, t∗, x∗, u∗, v)− w+‖2) =
∑
z∈Σh
d
‖z − w+‖2p(t∗, x∗, t+, z, u∗, v). (16)
Further,
‖z − w+‖2 = ‖(z − x∗) + (x∗ − w∗) + (w∗ − w+)‖2
= ‖x∗ − w∗‖2 + 2〈x∗ − w∗, z − x∗〉
−2〈x∗ − w∗, w+ − w∗〉+ ‖z − x∗‖2 + ‖w+ − w∗‖2.
It follows from (12) that∥∥∥∥ ddtζ1(t+, t, t∗, w∗, v∗)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ K√d, ‖w+ − w∗‖2 ≤ K2d(t+ − t∗)2. (17)
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From Lemma 1 it follows that∑
z∈Σh
d
‖z − x∗‖2p(t∗, x∗, t+, z, u∗, v)
≤
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
‖ − hei + hej‖2 1
h
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
Qij(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)ντ(dv)dτ
+ 2d3αh(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗)
≤ 2hd2K(t+ − t∗) + 2d3αh(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗).
(18)
For simplicity denote ζ∗(t) = ζ1(t, t+, t∗, w∗, u, v∗). We have that for each t there
exists a probability µt on V such that
dζ∗
dt
(t) =
∫
u∈U
ζ∗(t)Q(t, ζ∗(t), u, v∗)µt(du).
Therefore, ∑
z∈Σh
d
〈x∗ − w∗,w+ − w∗〉p(t∗, x∗, t+, z, u∗, v)
=
〈
x∗−w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
u∈U
ζ∗(t)Q(t, ζ∗(t), u, v∗)µt(du)dt
〉
.
(19)
Define
̺(δ) , sup{|y′′Q(t′′, y′′, u, v)− y′Q(t′, y′, u, v)| :
t′, t′′ ∈ [0, T ], y′, y′′ ∈ Σd, u ∈ U, v ∈ V, |t′ − t′′| ≤ δ, ‖y′ − y′′‖ ≤ δK
√
d}.
(20)
We have that ̺(δ)→ 0, as δ → 0. From (17), (19), and (20) it follows that∑
z∈Σh
d
〈x∗ − w∗, w+ − w∗〉p(t∗, x∗, t+, z, u∗, v)
≥
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
u∈U
w∗Q(t∗, w∗, u, v∗)µt(du)dt
〉
−
√
2d̺(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗).
(21)
Using Lemma 1 one more time we get the inequality∑
z∈Σh
d
〈x∗ − w∗, z − x∗〉p(t∗, x∗, t+, z, u∗, v)
≤
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
〈x∗ − w∗,−hei + hej〉1
h
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
x∗iQij(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt
+ 2d3αh(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗).
(22)
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The first term in the right-hand side of (22) can be transformed as follows. Denote
for simplicity
Q̂ij =
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
Qij(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt.
Note that Q̂ = (Q̂ij)
d
i,j=1 is a Kolmogorov matrix. That means that
−
∑
j 6=i
Q̂ij = Q̂ii.
We have that
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(−hei + hej) 1
h
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
x∗iQij(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt
=
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
ejx∗,iQ̂ij −
d∑
i=1
x∗,ie
i
∑
j 6=i
Q̂ij =
=
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
ejx∗,iQ̂ij =
d∑
j=1
[
d∑
i=1
x∗,iQ̂ij
]
ej = x∗Q̂.
This and (22) yield the estimate
∑
z∈Σh
d
〈x∗ − w∗, z − x∗〉p(t∗, x∗, t+, z, u∗, v)
≤
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt
〉
+ 2d3αh(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗).
(23)
Substituting (17)–(21), (23) in (16) we get the estimate
E
h
t∗x∗(‖X (t+,t∗, x∗, u∗, v)− w+‖2) ≤ ‖x∗ − w∗‖2
+ 2
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt
〉
− 2
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
u∈U
w∗Q(t∗, w∗, u, v∗)µt(du)dt
〉
+ 2Kd2h(t+ − t∗) + (6d3αh(t+ − t∗) +
√
2d̺(t+ − t∗)) · (t+ − t∗).
(24)
Let L be a Lipschitz constant of the function y 7→ yQ(t, y, u, v) i.e. for all y′, y′′ ∈
Σd, t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U , v ∈ Q
‖y′Q(t, y′, u, v)− y′′Q(t, y′′, u, v)‖ ≤ L‖y′ − y′′‖.
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We have that
2
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt
〉
− 2
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
u∈U
w∗Q(t∗, w∗, u, v∗)µt(du)dt
〉
≤ 2
∫ t+
t∗
∫
u∈U
∫
v∈V
[〈
x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)
〉
−
〈
x∗−w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v∗)
〉]
νt(dv)µt(du)dt
+ 2L‖x∗ − w∗‖2(t+ − t∗).
The choice of u∗ and v∗ gives that for all u ∈ U and v ∈ V
〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)〉 ≤ 〈x∗ − w∗, x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u, v∗)〉.
Consequently, we get the estimate
2
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
V
x∗Q(t∗, x∗, u∗, v)νt(dv)dt
〉
−2
〈
x∗ − w∗,
∫ t+
t∗
∫
u∈U
w∗Q(t∗, w∗,u, v∗)µt(du)dt
〉
≤ 2L‖x∗ − w∗‖2(t+ − t∗).
(25)
From (24) and (25) the conclusion of the Lemma follows for
β = 2L, C = 2d2K, κh(δ) = 6d3αh(δ) +
√
2d̺(δ).
6 Near Optimal Strategies
In this section we prove Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let v ∈ Vh[s] be a control of the second player. Consider a
partition ∆ = {tk}mk=1 of the time interval [s, T ]. If x0, x1, . . . , xm are vectors, x0 = y
then denote by pˆhr (x1, . . . , xr,∆) the probability of the event X h1 [tk, s, y, uˆ,∆, v] = xk
for k = 1, r. Define vectors w0, . . . , wm recursively in the following way. Put
w0 , χˆ1(s, y) = y, (26)
for k > 0 put
wk , ψˆ1(tk, tk−1, xk−1, wk−1). (27)
If w0, . . . , wm are defined by rules (26), (27) and r ∈ 1, n we write
(w0, . . . , wr) = gr(x0, . . . , xr−1,∆).
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In addition, put g0(∆) , y.
Below we use the transformation G(·,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) of the stochastic
X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v] defined in the following way. If xi are values of X h1 [ti, s, y, uˆ,∆, v],
i = 0, . . . , r, and (w0, . . . , wr) = gr(x0, . . . , xr−1,∆), then we put
G(tr,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) , wr.
Generally, the stochastic process G(·,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) is non-Markov.
Further, if ui = uˆ(ti, xi, wi), i = 0, . . . , r, and (w0, . . . , wr) = gr(x0, . . . , xr−1,∆),
we write ςr(x0, . . . , xr,∆) , ur.
We have that for any r ∈ 1, m
E
h
sy(‖X h1 [tr, s, y, uˆ,∆,v]−G(tr,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖2)
=
∑
x1,...,xr
‖xr − gr(x0, . . . , xr−1,∆)‖2pˆr(x0, . . . , xr,∆)
=
∑
x1,...,xr−1
pˆr−1(x0, . . . , xr−1,∆) ·
∑
xr
‖xr − gr(x0, . . . , xr−1,∆)‖2
·P htr−1xr−1(X(tr, tr−1, xr−1, ςr−1(x0, . . . , xr−1), v) = xr).
(28)
By Lemma 2 we have that∑
xr
‖xr − gr(x1, . . . , xr−1,∆))‖2
·P htr−1xr−1(X(tr,tr−1, xr−1, ςr−1(x0, . . . , xr−1), v) = xr)
≤ (1 + β(tr − tr−1))‖xr−1 − gr−1(x0, . . . , xr−2,∆)‖2
+Ch · (tr−tr−1) + κh(tr − tr−1) · (tr − tr−1).
From this and (28) it follows that
E
h
sy(‖X h1 [tr, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(tr,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖2)
≤ (1+β(tr − tr−1))Ehsy(‖xr−1 − gr−1(x0, . . . , xr−2)‖2)
+ Ch · (tr − tr−1) + κh(tr − tr−1) · (tr − tr−1).
(29)
Applying this inequality recursively we get
E
h
sy(‖X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖2)
≤ exp(β(T − s))Ehsy(‖x0 − g0(∆)‖2)
+ Ch · (T − s) + κh(d(∆)) · (T − s).
Taking into account the equality x0 = y = g0(∆) we conclude that
E
h
sy(‖X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖2) ≤ ǫ(h, d(∆)). (30)
Here we denote
ǫ(h, δ) , Dh+ Tκh(δ), D , CT.
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Note that for any h
ǫ(h, δ)→ Dh, as δ → 0. (31)
From (30) and Jensen’s inequality we get
E
h
sy(‖X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖) ≤
√
ǫ(d(∆), h). (32)
By construction of control with guide strategy uˆ
ϕ(s, y) = ϕ(t0, g0(∆)) ≥ ϕ(t1, g1(x0,∆)) ≥ . . .
≥ ϕ(tm, gm(x0, . . . , xm0−1,∆)) = σ(gm(x0, . . . , xm0−1,∆)).
Hence,
σ(G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])) ≤ ϕ(s, y). (33)
Since σ is Lipschitz continuous with the constant R we have that for any partition
∆ and second player’s control v
σ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) ≤ ϕ(s, y) +R‖X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖.
This and (32) give the inequality
E
h
syσ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) ≤ ϕ(s, y) +R
√
ǫ(d(∆), h).
Passing to the limit as d(∆)→ 0 and taking into account the property ǫ(δ, h)→ Dh,
as δ → 0, (see 31) we obtain the first statement of the Theorem.
Now let us prove the second statement of the Theorem. Using Markov inequality
and (30) we get
P
(‖X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖ ≥ [ǫ(h, d(∆))]1/3)
= P
(‖X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖2 ≥ [ǫ(h, d(∆))]2/3)
≤ E
h
sy(‖X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖2)
[ǫ(h, d(∆))]2/3
≤ 3
√
ǫ(h, d(∆)).
Lipschitz continuity of the function σ and (33) yield the following inclusion
{σ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) ≥ ϕ(s, y) +R[ǫ(h, d(∆))]1/3} ⊂{‖X h1 [T, s,y, uˆ,∆, v]−G(T,X h1 [·, s, y, uˆ,∆, v])‖ ≥ [ǫ(h, d(∆))]1/3}.
Finally, for any partition ∆ and any second player’s control v ∈ Vh[s] we have that
P{σ(X h1 [T, s, y, uˆ,∆, v]) ≥ ϕ(s, y) +R[ǫ(h, d(∆))]1/3} ≤ [ǫ(h, d(∆))]1/3.
From this the second statement of the Theorem follows.
To prove Corollary 1 it suffices to replace the payoff function with −σ and inter-
change the players.
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7 Conclusion
In the paper we applied the deterministic strategy that is optimal for deterministic
zero-sum game to the Markov game describing interacting particle system. We showed
that it is near optimal. We considered control with guide strategy. This strategy
requires computer to storage and compute a finite dimensional vector that is an
evaluation of the current position. The question whether there exists an optimal
for differential game feedback deterministic strategy that is near optimal for Markov
game is open.
We restricted our attention to the Markov game describing the interacting particle
systems. The extensions of the results of the paper to the general case is the theme
of future works.
The author would like to thank Vassili Kolokoltsov for insightful discussions.
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